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Applicant/Petitioner, * 
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. Sections 35-1-82.53 (2), 35-1-86 and 63-46b-16. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the filing limitations found in Utah Code Ann. 
Sections 35-1-65 and 35-1-66 violate the open court provision of 
the Utah Constitution? 
Priority No. 7 
Case No. 920237-CA 
2. Whether Utah Code Ann. Sections 35-1-65 and 35-1-66 
arbitrarily impose time limitations for filing claims for workers1 
compensation benefits in violation of the equal protection clause 
of the Utah Constitution? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A correction of error standard giving no deference to the 
Industrial Commission's interpretation of the law is the 
appropriate standard of review in this case. Utah Code Ann. §63-
46b-16 (4) (a) and 63-46b-16 (4) (d) Velarde v. Board of Review. 
831 P.2d 123, 125 (Utah App. 1992), Avis v. Board of Review. 194 
Utah Adv. Rep. 57 (Utah App. 1992) 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The applicable versions of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-65 and 35-1-66 
and Article I, §11 and Article I, §24 of the Utah Constitution are 
set forth verbatim in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case: 
This is an action wherein the petitioner is seeking 
judicial review of the Order of the Industrial Commission dated 
March 12, 1992 denying Petitioner^ Motion for Review. Re 54-57 
B. Course of Proceedings: 
On May 21, 1992, Petitioner filed an Application for 
Hearing with the Industrial Commission of Utah seeking, among other 
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things, additional temporary total disability and permanent partial 
disability benefits. R. 11 
Following an attorney conference, which was scheduled on 
November 10, 1991, at the request of respondent's counsel, the 
Administrative Law Judge entered on Order of Dismissal. R. 15, 38 
On December 17, 1991, Petitioner filed his Motion for 
Review with the Industrial Commission. R. 41-45 That motion was 
denied and the Order of Dismissal was affirmed on March 12, 1992. 
R. 54-57 
Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Review with 
this court on April 10, 1992. R. 59 This court issued such writ 
on April 10, 1992. R. 61 
C. Disposition by the Industrial Commission: 
On March 12, 1992, the Industrial Commission affirmed the 
Order of Dismissal of the Administrative Law Judge by concluding 
that the Petitioners claims are barred by Utah Code Ann. 35-1-65 
and 35-1-66. R. 54-57 
RELEVANT FACTS 
Respondents agree the relevant facts are as set forth in 
Petitioner's Brief which are copied here from Petitioner's Brief 
for the convenience of the court. 
1. Petitioner, hereinafter "Mr. Middlestadt,M was injured in 
an industrial accident on August 16, 1976, (with Mountain Fuel 
Supply) and December 5, 1980 (with Comtrol, Inc.) R. 4, 8, 18, 26. 
2. On April 2, 1985, following an evidentiary hearing and 
the issuance of a medical panel report, the Administrative Law 
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Judge entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
awarding Mr. Middlestadt, among other things, temporary disability 
benefits and permanent partial disability benefits as a result of 
the August 16, 1976 and December 5, 1980, industrial accidents. R. 
3-10 
3. The Respondents have paid Mr. Middlestadt benefits 
pursuant to the April 2, 1985, Order. R. 11, 27 
4. Mi:. Middlestadt had back surgeries on or about November 
16, 1987, and October 24, 1990. These surgeries are secondary to 
the original industrial injuries of August 16, 1976 and December 5, 
1980. R. 35, 141 
5. On May 21, 1991, Mr. Middlestadt filed an Application for 
Hearing seeking, among other things, additional temporary total and 
permanent partial disability benefits for the injuries he sustained 
in the August 16, 1976, and December 5# 1980, industrial accidents. 
R. 11 
6. Following a November 19, 1991, attorney conference [R. 
32], which conference was requested by Counsel for Respondents [R. 
15], the Administrative Law Judge entered an Order of Dismissal on 
November 21, 1991. R. 38 
7. The Administrative Law Judge entered his Order of 
Dismissal of his own volition, without Motion by Respondents and 
without entering any Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (he 
concluded there was no justiciable issue). R. 38 
8. The medical evidence before the Industrial Commission 
supports Mr. Middlestadt•s claims. Dr. J. Lynn Smith has indicated 
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that Mr. Middlestadt•s November 16, 1987, and October 24, 1990, 
surgeries "are secondary to" the August 16, 1976 and December 5, 
1980, industrial accidents. R. 141 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The critical issue to be resolved by this court is whether the 
time limitations for filing of claims under Utah Code Ann. S35-1-65 
and §35-1-66 violate provisions of the Utah Constitution. 
Mr. Middlestadt contends that he could not file for additional 
workers1 compensation benefits until he had surgeries in November 
1987 and October 1990. Obviously, if the December 5, 1980 injury 
contributed to the need for surgery, Mr. Middlestadt clearly could 
have filed a timely claim following the November 1987 surgery, but 
the October 1990 surgery does raise the statute of limitations 
issue. The statute provides for payment of medical expenses 
necessitated by industrial accidents for an indefinite period of 
time but the statute does set an eight year limit for which the 
employer and/or insurance carrier is liable for the payment of 
weekly compensation benefits. 
Petitioner argues that to affirm the Industrial Commission's 
denial of benefits is not just unfair and unjust but is absurd. 
This argument is without merit. The same argument could be made 
with respect to most any statute of limitations or statute 
providing defined benefits and completely fails to recognize the 
appropriateness and reasons why most statutory rights involve some 
appropriate limits or limitation of time within which claims can be 
asserted. In the strictest sense, the period of limitation for 
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awarding benefits set forth in §35-1-65 and §35-1-66 are neither a 
statute of repose nor a statue of limitations. It is simply a 
limitation on the amount of compensation which an injured worker is 
entitled to receive and the period of time within which the weekly 
benefits must be incurred. Medical benefits can continue 
indefinitely. 
In resolving an issue very similar to the issue presented 
here, this court has recently ruled in Avis v. Board of Review, 194 
Utah Adv. Rep. 57 (Utah App. 1992) contrary to the assertions of 
Petitioner, the limitations set forth in the act itself neither 
violate the Hopen courts" provision nor the equal protection clause 
of the Utah Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE LIMITATIONS OF TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY WEEKLY 
COMPENSATION BENEFITS IN SECTION 35-1-65 AND 35-1-66 ARE NEITHER 
STATUTES OF REPOSE NOR STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND ARE NOT 
VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 11, THE "OPEN COURTS" PROVISION OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
It is WCFfs position that Section 35-1-65 and 35-1-66 are not 
violative of the "Open Courts11 provision of the Utah Constitution. 
Section 35-1-65 U.C.A. states in pertinent part: 
...In no case shall such compensation benefits 
exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury over a period of eight years from the 
date of the injury. 
Section 35-1-66 U.C.A., prior to the 1988 amendment, stated in 
pertinent part: 
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The Commission may make a permanent petrtial 
disability award at any time prior to eight 
years after the date of injury to any employee 
whose physical condition resulting from such 
injury is not finally healed and fixed eight 
years after the date of injury and who files 
an Application for such purpose prior to the 
expiration of such eight year period. 
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have a remedy by 
due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunal in this state, 
by himself or counsel, any civil case to which 
he is a party. 
Middlestadt argues in his memorandum that Section 35-1-65 
U.C.A. is an unconstitutional statute of repose. The first thing 
this court should recognize is that Section 35-1-65 U.C.A. is 
technically neither a statute of limitations nor a statute of 
repose. Instead, it places a limitation on the amount of 
compensation which an injured worker is entitled to receive with 
respect to the dollar amount, the total number of weeks of 
compensation and the period of time after the accident within which 
the weekly benefits must be incurred. It does not totally bar the 
right to compensation benefits. In fact, medical benefits can 
continue indefinitely if they remain reasonably necessary, 
reasonably related to the industrial accident fKennecott Copper 
Corporation v. Industrial Comm'n. 597 P.2d 875 (Utah 1979)] and 
provided there is not a greater gap than three years between the 
incurrence of the expenses and further provided the expenses are 
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submitted to the employer or insurance carrier within that three 
year period. Section 35-1-99(2) , U.C.A., 1988. 
In the context of the Occupational Disease Act, Section 35-2-1 
et. seq. U.C.A. which is equally applicable to the Workers1 
Compensation Act, this court stated the proposition that "[t]he 
Legislature clearly has power to alter the form of or to limit [a 
diseased workmanfs] compensation for his disease.11 Wrolstad v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 786 P.2d 243 (Utah App. 1990) at 
244. 
The concept of statutes of limitations and statutes of repose 
is that each wholly bars a personfs right. With a statue of 
limitations the right is barred with the passage of a specific 
period after the individual discovers or should have discovered 
that he or she has a right. With a statute of repose, the right is 
barred after a specific period of time even if the person could not 
reasonably have discovered the existence of the right. See, i.e. 
discussions in Berrv v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 
1985); Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989); 
Wrolstad v. Industrial Commission of Utah., supra.; Sun Valley 
Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, Inc., 782 P.2d 188 
(Utah 1989). Notwithstanding Mr. Middlestadtfs mis-categorization 
of the damage limitation period of Section 35-1-65 U.C.A., the 
proper analysis for determining the constitutionality of a statute 
of limitation or statute of repose under the "open courts" 
provision has been set forth clearly by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., supra.: 
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We hold that [the open courts provision 
is] properly accommodated by applying a two-
part analysis. First. Section 11 is satisfied 
if the law provides an injured person an 
effective and reasonable alternative remedy 
"by due course of law" for vindication of his 
constitutional interest... 
Second, if there is no substitute or 
alternative remedy provided, abrogation of the 
remedy or cause of action may be justified 
only if there is a clear social or economic 
evil to be eliminated and the elimination of 
an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary 
or unreasonable means for achieving the 
objective. 
Id. at 680 (emphasis added; citations omitted) ; see also Sun Valley 
Water Beds v. Herm Hughes & Son, supra. 
A statute survives the Berrv analysis if either one of the two 
prongs of the analysis is met. Section 35-1-65 U.C.A., as applied 
to Mr. Middlestadt•s claim meets both prongs: (1) Mr. Middlestadt 
had an effective remedy of workersfs compensation benefits of which 
he availed himself and (2) though appropriately limited, Sections 
35-1-65 and 35-1-66 U.C.A. provides a means to avoid the clear 
economic and social evil of the total destitution of industry's 
injured by providing benefits to all workers injured or killed 
fl
...by accident arising out of and in the course of his 
employment..." (Sections 35-1-45 and 35-1-66, U.C.A.) regardless 
of "fault11 of either the employer or the injured employee. In that 
manner, the employee is provided a more sure and more speedy 
administrative remedy than under the civil tort system which is 
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lengthier and less certain.1 That give and take is what makes the 
Workers1 Compensation Act Constitutional. See discussions on 
constitutionality contained in Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 
U.S. 418, 44 S. Ct. 153, 68 L. Ed. 366 (1923); Cudahy Packing Co. 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 60 Utah 161, 207 P. 148, 28 A.L.R. 1394 
(1922), aff'd, 263 U.S. 418, 44 S. Ct. 153, 68 L. Ed. 366 (1923). 
Mr. Middlestadt relies heavily on Wrolstad v. Industrial 
Comm'n of Utah. supra., in asserting his "open courts" claim. 
However, the resolution in that case of the "alternative remedy" 
question can be differentiated from the present case. In Wrolstad. 
the plaintiff developed asbestosis ten years after leaving his 
employment as an electrician. The Commission denied his claim for 
disability benefits under the Occupational Disease Act, supra., 
because his total disability did not arise within one year from his 
employment as required under Section 35-2-13(a)(2) U.C.A. In 
holding that the statute of repose violated the "open courts" 
provision of the Utah Constitution, the Court of Appeals determined 
"Workmen's Compensation Acts were designed to correct what had become a generally 
recognized eyiL Prior to their enactment, the personal representatives or heirs of a workman killed 
in the course; of his employment [or an injured workman] could not recover [damages] unless 
negligence on the part of the employer could be established. Moreover, the defenses of contributory 
negligence, ... assumption of the risk, and the fellow servant rule, frequently defeated the cause of 
action. Even where recoveries were had, they usually came only after months or years of expensive 
litigation, and were largely reduced by attorney's fees and other costs. On the other hand, where 
recoveries were allowed, sympathetic juries frequently returned grossly excessive verdicts.... 
The intention of [workers' compensation! acts, then was to secure 
workmen and their dependents ... against becoming objects of charity, by making 
reasonable compensation for calamities incidental to the employment, and to make 
human wastage in industry part of the cost of production.... Compensation ... has 
no relation to fault, is fixed or limited by statute...." 
Henrie v. Rocky Mountain Packing Corporation. 196 P.2d 487 (Utah 1948) at 493. (Emphasis added.) 
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that Mr. Wrolstad had no alternative remedy under the Act. He 
could neither sue in tort because of the Exclusive Remedy Provision 
of the Occupational Disease Act nor could he pursue relief under 
the Act itself because of the one year repose period. 
However, both the facts and the applicable statutory provision 
in Wrolstad differ from those at issue in the present case. Here, 
Mr. Middlestadt has received substantial benefits. The benefits 
are constitutionally limited by the statutory formula used to 
establish the compensation rate, the total number of weeks of 
benefits the employer is obligated to pay and by the outside limit 
of payments to those incurred within eight years following the 
accident.2 
Even if the court should consider the eight year benefit 
period a statute of limitations or statue of repose, the Berry, 
supra., analysis, when applied to Section 35-1-65 U.C.A. does not 
result in a violation of the "open courts" provision of the Utah 
Constitution. Alternative remedies were available and benefits 
were received by Mr. Middlestadt. Mr. Middlestadt has a continuing 
medical benefit if he remains qualified. There are clear social 
and economic evils eliminated by the statute which status is 
reasonably and carefully accomplished. The statute does not 
violate the Utah Constitution in any respect. 
It should not be forgotten that Middlestadt has the additional benefit 
under the Act to permanent total disability benefits from his employer and the 
Employer's Reinsurance Fund should he so qualify. . The permanent total 
compensation benefit as of the time of his accident had no outside period within 
which his claim must be filed so long as the condition of permanent total 
disability is causally connected to the industrial accident. Section 35-1-67 
U.C.A. 
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In the event the court disagrees with the foregoing argument, 
it is Respondents position that §35-1-65 and §35-1-66 U.C.A. are 
not violative of the "open courts11 provision of the Utah 
Constitution nor do they violate the equal protection clause of the 
Utah Constitution. The courtfs recent decision in the case of Avis 
v. Board of Review, supra, although pertaining to a different 
section of the Workers1 Compensation Act, has particular 
significance with respect to these issues. In the Avis decision, 
the court addressed the constitutionality of §35-1-99 (1974). The 
analysis, however, is equally applicable to a determination as to 
the constitutionality of §35-1-65 and §35-1-66 U.C.A. Clearly, 
§35-1-99 is a statute of limitations because the time period runs 
from the date of injury and not from a point in time unrelated to 
when the cause of action arose. Because of this, this court noted 
that "the Berry line of cases is not directly applicable, but we 
consider their general constitutional analysis under the open 
courts provision." In the Avis case the court analyzed the 
applicability of the case of Wrolstad v. Industrial Commission* 786 
P.2d 243 (Utah App. 1990), the Berry line of cases and multiple 
cases dealing with statutes of limitations. Other cases cited 
include Velarde v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 123 (Utah App. 1992), 
Mvers v. McDonald's, 635 P.2d 84, (Utah 1981), Order of R.R. 
Tels. v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. 321 U.S. 342, 348-49, 64 S. 
Ct. 582, 586 (1944). None were found applicable. 
Also in the Avis case, this court cited, McHenry v. Utah 
Vallev Hospital. 724 F. Supp. 835, 837 (D. Utah 1989) for the 
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proposition that state legislatures possess the discretion to enact 
statutes of limitations and that these statutes are presumptively 
constitutional and M [A] statute of limitations is constitutionally 
sound if it should allow a reasonable, not unlimited time in which 
to bring suit.11 Id, 
This court specifically addressed the matter of alternative 
remedies in the Avis decision and the analysis seems equally 
applicable to the instant case. The court said: 
Petitioner knew of his injury on July 4, 1968. He 
received medical treatment for his injury and was aware 
of recurring back pain over a period of several years. 
Therefore, even though Petitioner did not seek a 
disability rating or file a compensation claim until 
twenty-two years after his accident, he knew of his 
injury and could have filed for compensation within the 
statutory period. Petitioner seeks a rule which would 
postpone running of the statute until he "discovered" the full extent of his injury. The workers' compensation 
statute, however, does not require stabilization before filing for benefits. Petitioner's argument that he had 
no alternative remedy because the Workers' Compensation 
Act is his exclusive remedy, also fails because under 
either the act or a civil tort action, he would be 
subject to a statute of limitations. His alternative 
remedy was to timely file. 
We conclude that the statute of limitations found in Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-99 does not, on its face, manifest a 
denial of justice that would require us to overcome the 
statute's presumption of constitutionality. It provides 
a reasonable time to file a claim, dating from the date 
of injury. See McHenry 724 Fed. Supp. at 83 7 (upholding 
the constitutionality of Utah's four-year statute of 
limitations for civil actions) . We further conclude that 
the statute as applied to petitioner does not violate the 
open courts provision of the Utah Constitution because he 
knew of his injury within the limitations period. 
This court in Avis went on to comment about the 
inapplicability of the equal protection clause of the constitution 
by stating: 
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The staxtute of limitations in §35-1-99 classifies injured 
workers in a reasonable manner in that all injured 
workers are subject to the same limitations period within 
which to file a claim for compensation. An injured 
workers disability rating is a component that is separate 
and distinct from the actual compensation claim, and the 
workers responsibility is to timely file within the 
statutory period with or without a disability rating in 
hand. We also conclude that limiting the compensation 
claim period for workers bears a reasonable relationship 
to the achievement of a legitimate legislative purpose. 
Limiting compensation claims to a three-year period from 
the date of the accident protects employers and the State 
of Utah Second Injury Fund from having to defend stale 
claims—a legitimate legislative purpose. 
If anything, the three-year limitation for filing claims is 
more restrictive than the eight-year limit for paying claims as set 
forth in §35-1-65 and §35-1-66. There is no logical distinction 
between the two so far as the open courts provision and the equal 
protection clause are concerned. In the instant case, the 
Applicant received all benefits due him at the time he filed his 
claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The outside limitation within which compensation payments must 
be incurred is neither a statute of limitations nor a statute of 
repose. It is, rather, a reasonable limit to the benefits allowed 
under the Workers1 Compensation Act of Utah. 
If the court should consider the eight year benefit period a 
statute of limitations or statute of repose, the Berry, supra., 
analysis, when applied to §35-1-65 and §35-1-66 U.C.A. does not 
result in a violation of the "open courts11 provision nor a 
violation of the equal protection clause of the Utah Constitution. 
Alternative remedies were available and benefits were received by 
-14-
Mr. Middlestadt. Mr. Middlestadt has a continuing medical benefit 
if he remains qualified. There are clear social and economic evils 
eliminated by the statute which status is reasonably and carefully 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Utah Constitution Article I, Sections 11 and 24 
2. U.C.A, Sections 35-1-65 and 35-1-66 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person 
shall be barred, from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
35-1-66. Partial disability—Scale of payments.—Where the injury 
causes partial disability for work, the employee shall receive, during such 
disability for not to exceed 312 weeks over a period of not to exceed eight 
years from the date of the injury, compensation equal to 66 2/3% of the 
difference between that employee's average weekly wages before the 
accident and the weekly wages that employee is able to earn thereafter, 
but not more than a maximum of 66 2/3% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury per week and in addition thereto $5 for a 
dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age 
of eighteen years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children, 
but not to exceed 66 2/3% of the state average weekly wage at the time 
of the injury per week. 
The commission may make a permanent partial disability award at 
any time prior to eight years after the date of injury to any employee 
whose physical condition resulting from such injury is not finally healed 
and fixed eight years after the date of injury and who files an application 
for such purpose prior to the expiration of such eight-year period. 
In case the partial disability begins after a period of total disability, 
the period of total disability shall be deducted from the total period of 
compensation. 
In no case shall the weekly payments continue after the disability ends, 
or the death of the injured person. 
In the case of the following injuries the compensation shall be 66 2/3% 
of that employee's average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but 
not more than a maximum of 66 2/3% of the state average weekly wage 
at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per 
week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor 
child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent 
minor children, but not to exceed 66 2/3% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury per week, to be paid weekly for the number 
of weeks stated against such injuries respectively, and shall be in addition 
to the compensation hereinbefore provided for temporary total disability, 
to wit: 
(A) to (C) • * • [Same as parent volume.] 
Permanent hearing loss caused by accident shall be determined and 
paid as follows: 
"Loss of hearing" is defined as the binaural hearing loss measured in 
decibels with frequencies of 500, 1000 and 2000 cycles per second (cps) 
using pure tone air conduction audiometric instruments (ASA 1951) ap-
proved by nationally recognized authorities in the field of measurement of 
hearing impairment Reduction of hearing ability in frequencies above 
2000 cycles per second shall not be considered in determining compensable 
disability, 
36-1-65. Temporary disability—Amount of payments—State average 
weekly wage defined.—(1) In case of temporary disability, the employee 
•hall receive 6654% of his average weekly wages at the time of the injury 
so long as such disability is total, but not more than a maximum of 100% 
of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and 
not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent wife and 
$5 for each dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years, up to 
a maximum of four such dependent minor children not to exceed the 
average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not 
to exceed 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week. In no case shall such compensation benefits exceed 312 weeks 
at the rate of 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury over a period of eight years from the date of the injury. 
(2) • • • [Same as parent volume]. 
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The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motion for 
Review of applicant which was received on December 17, 1991 in the 
above captioned matter, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12. 
On April 2, 1985, the administrative law judge (ALJ) entered 
his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order awarding the 
applicant benefits which arose from industrial accidents which 
occurred on August 16, 1976, and December 5, 1980. Subsequent to 
the 1985 order, the applicant had two surgeries on his back for 
which he seeks additional workers7 compensation benefits. 
Applicant claims that at the request of defendants' counsel, 
an attorneys' conference was held on November 19, 1991. He also 
claims that after the defendants' counsel had briefly outlined the 
present claim to the ALJ, the ALJ stated that applicant had no 
further claim to benefits based upon the dates of the industrial 
accidents, but that the defendants must pay the applicant's medical 
expenses pursuant to the April 2, 1985 order. On November 21, 
1991, the ALJ entered an Order of Dismissal which stated that there 
was no justiciable issue at that time. 
Applicant alleges that he cannot respond to the order since no 
motion was made by defendants, and since the ALJ failed to state 
the basis for the order. However, applicant states that he 
understands that the ALJ's statement at the hearing indicated that 
defendants must pay the medical expenses related to his industrial 
accident. Defendant Workers Compensation Fund does not dispute its 
responsibility Cor payment of these medical expenses. The 
disconnect arises as to whether the defendants are obligated to pay 
for temporary total disability compensation (TTC) and permanent 
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partial disability compensation (PPC) in connection with the 
additional surgeries. 
Applicant claims that the defendants are obligated for the 
TTC, and PPC,, and that the IC has continuing jurisdiction to make 
them comply. The defendants argue that the eight year statute of 
limitations has run under U.C.A. Sections 35-1-65 and 35-1-66. 
The pertinent portion of Section 35-1-65 which discusses TTC 
provides: 
...In no case shall such compensation benefits 
exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
ov€»r a period of eight years from the date of the 
injury* 
U.C.A. Section 35-1-65 (1953 as amended 1977). 
The pertinent portion of Section 35-1-66 which discusses PPC 
provides: 
Th€i commission may make a permanent partial 
disability award at any time prior to eight 
yeairs after the date of injury to an emplo-
yee* whose physical condition resulting from 
such injury is not finally healed and fixed 
eight years after the date of injury and who 
files an application for such purpose prior 
to the expiration of such eight-year period. 
U.C.A. Section 35-1-66 (1953 as amended 1977). 
Our reading of the above statutes indicates that the applicant 
could not receive TTC for any period outside the eight year period 
from the date of injury, and in the case of PPC he must have 
actually filed his application within such eight year period. 
We will examine the relevant dates to see if the statutory 
mandate has been met. Applicant's latest injury occurred on 
December 5, 1980. The last day for filing would have been December 
5, 1988. Applicant filed on May 20, 1991. This filing was 
therefore time barred. 
Applicant claims that the payment of benefits by defendants 
under the April 1985 order shows that defendants have admitted 
responsibility, and that this somehow tolls the statute of 
limitations. He cites United Parcel v. Ind. Comm'n. 809 P.2d 139, 
141-142 (Utah App. 1991) for this proposition. 
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The United Parcel case is inapplicable since the tolling 
provision relied upon in United Parcel became effective after the 
date of Mr. Middlestadt's injuries. Jd. at 141. In the instant 
case, the provisions of Section 35-1-99 which apply to Mr. 
Middlestadt mention no tolling provision, and further, defendant 
Workers Compensation Fund is correct when it states that neither 
United Parcel nor Section 35-1-99 apply in Mr. Middlestadt's case. 
The statutes of limitation in Section 35-1-99 do not apply, 
and the relevant statutes of limitation are contained in Sections 
35-1-65 and 66 which have been discussed previously. 
Although the ALJ's order could have elaborated more on his 
reasons for dismissing applicant's claim, and the finding of no 
justiciable issue to be litigated, we believe that the application, 
the answer, and the order provide sufficient information on which 
to base a dismissal. The application was dated on May 20, 1991, 
and was apparently filed on that date or later. Applicant claimed 
two injuries, one on August 16, 1976, and the other on December 5, 
1980. Both of these dates are well beyond eight years from the 
date of filing of the application. 
Defendant Workers Compensation Fund's answer to the 
application clearly states at Paragraph Numbers Three and Five that 
any compensation based on the dates of injury alleged by applicant 
would be wholly barred by statutes of limitation. 
Finally, applicant states that the Utah Constitution 
guarantees him a legal remedy for an injury done to his person. He 
cites Wrolstad v. Ind. Comm'n. 786 P.2d 243 (Utah App. 1990) for 
this proposition. The factual situation in the instant case is 
completely different. The applicant's injuries occurred, claims 
were filed, an order was entered, benefits were paid, and medical 
expenses related to the industrial injury will continue to be taken 
care of. In Wrolstad. the filing requirement based on Mr. 
Wrolstad's disease expired prior to the cause of action arising. 
This occurred in Mr. Wrolstad's case because of the extended 
latency period of his disease. Since the Sections 35-1-65 and 66 
are not bridled with the constitutional infirmity of Wrolstad. we 
must uphold these statutes of limitation. 
For all the previously stated reasons, we therefore hold that 
the ALJ's decision when viewed in the perspective of the entire 





IT IS ORDERED that the Order of Dismissal of the 
administrative law judge dated November 21, 1991 is affirmed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b-
16. The requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a 
transcript of the hearing for appeals purposes. 
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
The above-entitled matter having been duly considered, and it 
having been determined that: 
1. Respond to request for documentation. 
2. Provide medical records. 
3. Cooperate in investigating the case. 
4. Actively prosecute this matter. 
xx 5. Other: There is no justiciable issue at this time. 
And it appearing that the foregoing constitutes good cause for 
dismissing the claim, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the claim of the Applicant 
be, and the same is hereby, dismissed without prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review or specific 
written objection hereto must be filed with the Commission within 
thirty (30) days from date of this Order, or it shall be the final 
Order of the Commission, not sjubject to furtjieg^eview or appeal. 
Certified this 21st day of 
November 1991. 
ATTEST: 
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HA1XRQ: Raarias too* 334* ladastrial Coaamisaioa of Otab, 160 
last 300 toatb. Salt Laba Citf, Otab, oa Jaly 1*, 
19S4, at 0:30 A.R. O'clock. Said Mario* was paraaaat 
to Ordor aad Hot lea of tba Cossmittioa. 
SaTOlS: Tiaotby C. Allaa, AdRlaittratiaa Lav Jadga. 
APPKAKAMCSS: Tba Applicaat was praaaat aad raprataatad by Cbarias 
R. Sroua, Jr., Attoraay at Law. 
Tba Dafaadaata, Coatrol, lac., aad/or Stata Xaaaraaca 
Paad, vora praaaat aad raprataatad by Sraca Ullaoa, 
Attoraay at Uaf. 
Tba Dafaadaata* Moaataia Paal Supply aad/or Coatiaaatal 
Caaaaltf• aara rapraaaatad by P. &« Pataraoa, Attoraay 
at 
At tba eoaclaaioa of tba Svidaatiary Moarlai, tba awdical itanas aad 
qaattioat Mara submittad to a Radical Paaal appoiatad by tba Adaialstratlva 
Law Judga. Tba Radical Paaal Raport vat racaivad, aad eoplat vara dlatributad 
to tba partIat. Tba Stata Xaaaraaca Paad, by aad tbroafb coaatal, fllad a 
taquaat for ClarlfUatloa of tba Radical Paaal taport, wblcb was forward** to 
tba Radical Paaal. A Sapplaawatal Paaal taport vat racaivad aad copiat vara 
dittribatad to tba partiaa. Piftaaa (IS) dayt bavia* alaptad tiaca tba 
mailiaa of taid Sapplaawatal Radical Paaal taport* aad ao Objactioat baviac 
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been received tbarato; tba Radical Paeel teeort and tba Supplemental raael 
iaport ara adaiittad lato evidence. 
FXMDXMCS or FACT: 
tba Applicant* a first Injury to bis back occurred la approtimately 
1974. As a raaalt of this non-industrial back injury, ba eveetually received 
an LS-Sl discectomy froai J. Lynn Smith, M. D. Tba Applicant was fcsmporarlly 
totallr dlaablad for approsimately sit mouths, aad bad ao fartbar problems 
with his back aatil August 16, 1976, while working for Mountain Paal Supply. 
Oa that data, tba Applicant was employed as a utility men, and was c bang lag a 
meter ia aa old house* Ha juapad from a foar foot ladga aad twiatad bia back, 
and hud aa iasasdiata "electric jolt" down bis laft lag froai tba hip to tba 
kaaa. Tba Applicant than bad a char 11a borsa ia bia appar laft thigh for a 
coapla of waaks following tba injury, and also aoticad burning in bia laft hip 
acroas tha small of tba back. On August 27, 1976, Mr. Middalstadt was aaaa by 
Dr. J. Lynn Smith, complaining of burning in bis lag and laft hip. Dr. Smith 
bad him start with physical tbarapy aad abdication, but tba therapy mada bia 
condition worsa. Ha coatinaad with coaaervative cara until approsimataly 
Saptaaibar IS, 1976, wham ba was admit tad to tba St. Mark's Hospital by Dr. 
Smith. Dr. Smith parformad an aiploration of Le-5 on Saptambar 22, 1976, but 
nothing was discovered, further asploratlon waa coaductad at L5-31, and 
revealed scar tiasua which waa removed, and tha Doctor also parformad a 
foramiaotomy. Mr. Middalstadt had an uneventful recovery, and that wintar 
quarter atartad commarcial art classaa. Aa a raault, ha waa required to sit 
oa a stool and aftar doing so, notiead that ba waa havieg a burning aanaation 
bctweoe his shoaldar bladaa. In Saptambar of 1977, tba Industrial Commlssioa 
approved a Compensation Agraamant, wharaby tba Applicant waa paid a five 
percent permanent partial impairment award of IS .6 weeks payable at the rate 
of $112.67 or a total of $1,7$7.63, for the industrial injury of August 16, 
1976. 
In Movember of 1978, the Applicant relocated to Denver, where he 
started a construction company with his two brothers. The Applicant's job waa 
to do tha estimating, and make arraagemeats for the delivery of materials, bat 
he did aot do hard labor. Durlag this time, the Applicaat bad ao burning paia 
ia his back. Ia August of I960, Hr. Hlddelatadt returned from Deover, and 
started working for the Defendant, Comtrol,, Inc. Comtrol waa eagaged ia the 
remodeliag of the Playhouae Theatre ia downtown Salt Lake City, and they were 
alao pouring concrete plantar bosea ia front of the LDS Church Offlea 
Boilding. On December S, 1980, Mr. Hiddelstadt sustained aa Industrial injury 
whilii lifting graaita caps from tha plaatera, which weighed anywhere from 350 
to 450 pounds. Hr. Middelatadt waa ia tha back of a pickup truck with his 
lead maa, whea tha laad man slipped, sad the Applicaat had the full weight of 
the cap for a oae foot drop. He had aa immediate electric jolt down his laft 
leg, which then subsided. On his drive home, he aot Iced that ha bad a burning 
In the laft hip. He coatinaad to work however aatil December 24, I960, whea 
he was laid eff due to a reduction ia force. At that time, he 
mm&mffimmmM? 
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was havlag cramping aad so bo made aa eppolntmeat to soo Dr. J. Lyaa Ssiitb. 
Dr. Saltb was first ablo to soo tbo Applleaat oa Jaauary *. 1981, aad 
placod bis oa a physical tborapy program tad told bla to stay off work. Tbo 
Applleaat startod receiving temporary total eoapeasatloa from tbo S U U 
Insurance fuad as of Jaaoary S9 1981, aad coatiaaod to receive tbo same aatll 
December 31, 1981. Baaed oa tbo Applleaat's testlmoay, It weald appoar tbat 
bo bas booa oadorpald temporary total disability for tbo porlod December 25. 
19*0 to aad Including Jaaoary 49 1981 or a porlod of oao week aad five days. 
Tbo Applleaat eoatlaaod with followup visits to Dr. Saltb, but when 
bis eoaditioa did aot improve, bo was roforrod oa January 29, 1981 for aa 
8MB. Tbo BMC was negative, so bo was eoatlaaod oa physical tborapy aad 
conservative eara. Towards tbo oad of lurch, 1981, Mr. Hiddolstadt was bavin* 
a lot of difficulty, so Dr. Saltb roforrod bla for a CT Scaa. Tbo Seaa 
ladieatod a pott 1 bla dise fragment, so tbo Applleaat was adalttod to St. 
Mark's Hospital, aad oa April 15, 1981, Dr. Saltb roaovod sear tissue froa 
L5-S1. Approximately two or tbroo days after bis discharge, tbo Applleaat 
fall while takiag a shower, aad bis wound startod bloodies,. When be returned 
to the Doctor, be was advised tbat be bad aa iafectioa. After a course of 
aatibiodies9 Mr. Hiddolstadt bad a severe ease of dyseatery. After bis 
diarrhea had cleared, bis left knee beeaae quite swollea. Be waa tboa 
bospltalUed at St. Mark's Hospital oa May 18, 1981. It waa initially felt 
tbat the Applleaat bad aa iafectioa la bis kaoe9 bat a subseqeeat diagaosit 
was aade of Baiter's Syndrome or septle arthritis. Tbo Applleaat was sooa by 
Dr. Saltb for the balaaeo of tbo summer. 
Oa Septeaber 24, 1981, Mr. Mlddeletadt was sees by Dr. Dituri, la aa 
ladepeadent aedical exeaiaatloe arraafed by tbo State Zasuraace Puad. Dr. 
Dituri fouad that the Applleaat bad a 21 permanent partial iapairaeat of the 
whole body due to the Belter's Syndrome la bis left kaee9 as a result of the 
industrial aceident of Deeeaber 5, 1980 aad aa additional 5X of the low back 
due to the saae industrial injury. Thereafter, the Commission approved a 
Statemoat and Bequest based oa Dr. Dituri*s ratlags. Following this 
settlement of Jaauary 12, 1982, the Applleaat bad ao further problems until 
approximately March of 1983. 
At that time, he was working for Udisco, welch is the wholesale 
braaeb of Suatet Sports, pulling orders for sporting goods stores. This job 
requirod the Applleaat to push a small grocery cart dowa isles, aad involvod 
bending, twisting, turning, whils removing fishing equlpmeat ead light gue 
ports from various bins. As the Applleaat was straightening up from bending 
over, sometime in March of 1983, bo aoticed a spasm or muscle pull In his low 
back in the area of hit kidneyt. Me eoatlaued to beve this aaggiag backache, 
aad when it did not go away, be saw Dr. J. Lyaa Saltb on March IS, 1983. At 
that time, the Applicant was complaining of pa la radiatiag iato the left hip 
dowa the leg. He waa givea modi cat loa aad told to return la oae week. The 
Applicant did so. aad upoa bla return wes givea physical therapy aad 
abdication. The beat treatmeett givea by the tberepist however, worseaed the 
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Applicant's coodltloo9 so this woo dlscoatlnuad. Too Applicant roportod that 
tho burning bo bad at this tiaa woo la a dlffaraat aroa tbaa It bad booa 
provioosly. 
On March 31, 1983 tba Applicant racalvod a CT team, which iodleatod a 
baralatad disc at LS-S1, on tba laft a&da. Mr. Hiddalitadt waa raadalttad to 
St. Mark's Hospital and on April 6, 1983 Dr. Saith parfonaad a diacactoay aad 
lysis of adhaaioaa. Tba partlaa stlpulatad tbat tba Applicant waa taaporarily 
totally dlaablad from April 1, 1983 to and including July 1, 1983. tba 
Applicant than raturnad to work* but contlnuad to hava laft lag paia, so bo 
waa raadaittad to tba Hospital on July 10, 1983. Ha tbaa bad furtbar surgary 
oa July 13, 1983 fro» Dr. labaiaar aad Dr. SaUtb. Tba Applicant Bubaofooatly 
rataraad to work oa Octobar 29, 1983 at ftuasot Sports. Hr. Middalstadt was 
laat aaaa by Dr. J. Lynn Smith la Octobar of 1983. Tba Applicant coaplaias of 
problaaa la bit right hip, which atartad following tba sargary of April 6, 
1983. 
VItb tba filo la this poatura, tba caaa waa rafarrad to a Hadical 
Paaal for ita a valuation. Tho Paaal found tbat tba Applicant baa a 15X 
paranaaat partial iapairaaat duo to pro-ailatiag coadltloas, with 101 baiag 
dua to tho pra-aiiatlng back iajury, sod 3X baiag daa to tba loitor's 
Syadroaa. With ragard to tho iadaatrlal injury of August la, 1974, tba 
Hadical Paaal foaad a 2.5X iapalnaaat dua to tbat injury, aad a 2.SX 
iapairaaat dua to tba iadaatrlal injury of Dacaafcor 5, 1980. Tba Paaal also 
found that tha aargariaa of April 4, 1983 aad July 13, 1983 wara aacaaaitatad 
by tha aggragata combination of tha industrial injuria* of Dacoabar Sv 1980* 
August 16, 1976, aad tha aoa-ioduatrial iajory of 1974. Tha Paaal atatad that 
"If it had not baan for tha prior surgurUs (aicl and Injuria* tha aurgary of 
4/6/83 would aot hava takaa placa." Tha Adaiaistrativa Law Judga adopts tha 
Findings of tha Hadical Paaal at hit owa. 
Xa aaaaaalag tha liability for panaaaaat partial iapairaaat dua to aa 
industrial injury, it la aacaaaary to utlllaa tha formula aat forth io tha 
Hair caaa. That caaa providaa that tha iapalnaaat dua to tha industrial 
injury la aaaaaaad aa agaiaat tha raavUalng uaiapairad paraoa at tba tiaa of 
tha industrial Injury, la tha iaataat caaa, tha Applicant on Auguat 16, 1976 
would hava baan an 85X uniapairnd aaa for rat lag purposas. Accordingly, whoa 
tha 2.5X dua to tha induatrial Injury of Auguat 16, 1976 is appliad to tha 85X 
raaaiaiag uniapairad paraoa, 2.123X raaulta, or whoa roundad to tha naaraat 
whola nuabar 2X. 
Oa Dacaabar 5, 1980, tha Applicant waa aa 83X uaiapairad paraoa, 
which whaa aultlpliad by tha 2.5X raaultlag from tha induatrial iajury of 
Dacaabar 5, 1980, rasultt ia an iapairaaat of 2.073% or 2X whaa roundad to tba 
naaraat whola nuabar. Tha Applicant's total iapalnaaat froa all cauaaa aad 
conditions is 19X of tha whola paraoa. Purauaat to Saction 69 of tha Act, tba 
aaaloyar, Hoaataia Pual, ia aatitlad to ralaburaaaaat froa tha Sacoad Injury 
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Puad for tbo overpayaeat of peraaaeat partial Iapairaaat aa a reeult of tbo 
industrial injury of August 16, 1*76. Accordlot to tbo flit, tbo Carrior for 
Mooatala Pool, Coatlaoatal Caaaalty, bat paid tbo Applicant IS.a weeks at tbo 
rata of $112.67 par week for a total of 11,757.65 for a 51 peraaaeat partial 
lmpalrmoat, Pursuant to tbo finding of tbo Radical Paaol, tbo Applicaat 
should have received 21 or 6.24 weeks at tbo rata of $112.67 or a total of 
$703.06, tboroby resulting la aa overpayaeat of $1,054.59 by Coetlaeatal 
Caaaalty which aboald bo reiaborsed by tbo Secoad Injury Puad, aad should thea 
bo croditod by tbo Secoad Injury m o d as egaiast tboir liability to tbo 
Applicant. Tbo Stato Inauraaca Pood baa alao over paid peraaaeat partial 
iapairaaat benefits to tbo Applicaat aa a roatalt of tbo industrial iajury of 
December 5, I960. Tbo State Insurance Puad has paid 21.64 weeks at tbo rata 
of $153.00 par week or a total of $3,341.52 for a 71 peraaaeat partial 
iapairaaat. Tba Nodical Paaol fouad tbat tbo iapairaaat dua to tbo iadaatrial 
iajury was actually 21, or 6.24 weeks at tbo rata of $153.00 par week for a 
total of $954.72, tboroby aaklns aa overpayaeat by tbo Itato Xaauraaeo Puad of 
*2 , m . * 0 , ufbtca aboald bo reimbursed by tba Secoad Injury fuad aad credited 
by tbo Socoad Iajury Puad aa egaiast tboir liability to tbo Applicaat. Witb 
roapoct to relaburseaeet of teaporary total disability aad aadical espeeses, 
Coatlaoatal Caaaalty la oatltlod to reiaberseaeat froa tbo Socoad Iajury Puad 
for 15/17 or 661 of tbo aaouats tboy bavo previously paid for teaporary total 
coapoaaatioa aad/or aadleal aapoaaoa oa behalf of tbo Applicaat aa a roault of 
tbo industrial iajury of Aeaust 16, 1976. Tbo ftata laauraaco Puad ia 
aatitlod to roiaburaoaaat for 15/19 or 791 of tbo aaoaata tboy bavo previously 
paid for taaporary total coapoaaatioa aad/or aad leal aapoaaoa oa boaalf of tbo 
Applicaat aa a roaalt of tbo iadaatrial injury of Pocoabar 5, 1960. 
Finally, concerning tba axpoaaaa of tbo surgeries of April 6, 1983 
aad July 13, 1983, tba Administrative Law Judge adopts tba Findings of tbo 
Hadical Paaol witb roapoct to tbo relative contributions of tba Dafaadaata for 
tba oaod for tbo aaaa. Ia otbor words, tbo Ada!alucrative Law Judge faala 
that tba bast approach with raapoct to tbaaa aadical aipaaaaa aad attaadaat 
periods of taaporary total disability, ia to have tba Stata Inauraaca Puad pay 
tba Applicant's banafits in tba first instance ia this regard. However, the 
State laauraaca Fund aball be oatltlod to reiaburaeaeat froa the Second Injury 
Fund for 15/19 or 761 of tba aedical eipensas aad teaporary total coapeaaatioa 
for the lateat two surgeries. Ia addition, tbo State laauraaca Puad shall 
alao be oatltlod to roiaburaoaaat froa Coatlaoatal Caaaalty for 2/19 or 111 of 
the aadical axpoaaaa aad teaporary total disability for the laat two 
surgerlea. 
The Applicaat aball alao be aatitlod to aa award froa the Secoad 
Injury Fuad for his 151 permanent partial lapalraeat due to pre-existing 
conditions, which would entitle hia to aa award of 46.8 weeks payable at the 
rate of $153.00 or a total of $7,160.40. However, the Secoad Injury Puad is 
entitled to a credit for their ralaburaeaeat of the overpayaeats aade by 
Continental Caaaalty aad the Stato laauraaca Fund of their reapoaaibillty for 
permanent partial iapairaaat beaeflts, tboroby entitling the Applicaat to a 
oat lump sua of $3,719.01 for poraaaoat partial iapairaaat benefits. 
PAUL J . WOOtLSTADT 
otoai 
»AGS sxx 
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Paul J. Xiddalstadt i t aat l t lad to tsorkar's coapanaatioa baaafltt for 
tha industrial accidaatt of August 16, 1976 and Dacatbar 5, I960. 
OtDttJ 
XT XS THinrotl OtDttID that Dafandants, Mountain fual Supply and/or 
Coatlnantal Casualty, shall ralabursa tba ttata Iaturaaca Fund, for 111 of tha 
amounts paid by tho Stata Xnsuraaca fund for tsaporary total disability and 
aadical axpaasas as tha rasalt of tha surgarias of April 6, 1963 and July 13, 
1963. Said raiabursaaant to ba aada upon tba racaipt of a ratltioa from tba 
Stata Xasuraaca fund indicating tba amounts so aspaadad. 
XT XS FUKI8II OtDttID that tba Dafaadaats, Hoantain fual Supply 
and/or Continantal Casualty, sball ba aatltlad to reistorsaaaat from tba 
Sacood Injury fund for tba sua of $703.06, ufcicb sua rapraaaats tba ovar 
payaant by tba Dafaadaats of tbair liability for paraanant partial iapairaaat 
banafits as a rasult of tba industrial injury of August 16, 1976. 
XT XI F U K K t OUMOtED tnat tba Dufuadanti. Mountain Fual Supply 
and/or Coatlnantal Caaaalty, sball bo aatltlad to raiabursaaant from tba 
Sacood Injury Fund for SSI of any previously paid taaporary total coapanaatioa 
and/or aadical axpaasas as a rasult of tba industrial injury of August 16, 
1976; said raiabursaaant to ba bad apon tba oubaissioo of a Variflad ratltioa 
to tba Administrator of tba Sacond Injury Fund indicating tba amounts so 
axpandad. 
XT XS rUtTHSt OSOtStO that tha Dafaadaata, Coatrol, Inc. and/or Stata 
Xasuraaca Fund* pay Paal Hlddalstadt, coapanaatioa at tha rata of $213.00 par 
waak for 1.S71 vaaks or a total of $336.62, as taaporary total coapaaaatloa 
for tha pariod Dacaabar 25, 1980 to and including January 4, 1981; said 
banafits to ba paid In a lump sua. 
XT XS FUtTHtt OSDKttO that Dafaadanta, Coatrol, Inc. and/or Stata 
Xnsuraaca Fund, pay all aadical axpaasas iacurrad as tha raault of tha 
surgarias of April 69 19S3 and July 13, 19S3; aaid axpaaaaa to ba paid ia 
accordanca with tha aadical and Surgical Fua Scbadula of tba Industrial 
Coamiasion of Utah. 
XT XS FUtTHM OtDttID that Dafaudaafes, Coatrol, Inc. aad/or Stata 
Xnsuraaca Fund, pay Faal Hlddalstadt, coapaaaatloa at tha rata of $213.00 par 
vaak for 29 waaks or a total of $6,177.00, as coapanaatioa for taaporary total 
disability rasult lag from tba surgarias of April 6, 1963 and July 13, 1983; 
said banafits to ba paid ia a luap sua, laaa tba attoraay's faa to ba awardad 
pt^^rW^^wa 




XT XS PUKTXIt ORDERED that Defendants, Coatrol, lac. aad/or State 
Insurance Puad, pay Char las H. Srown, Jr., Attoraey for tha Applieaat, tha sua 
of $2,0*0.12, for services rasdarad la thla matter, tha same to ba dadaetad 
froai tha aforasaid award to tha Applieaat aad remitted directly to his of flea. 
XT IS PURTHEt OtMtBD that tha Dafaadaata, Control, lac. aad/or Stata 
Insurance Pund, shall ba aatitlad to reimbureemeat from tha Sacoad Injury Puad 
for 781 of tha medical axpaaaaa aad temporary total disability resulting from 
tha surgeries of April 4, 1983 aad July 13, 1983, aaid relatoirsemeat to ba had 
upoa tha submission of a Varlfiad Patltloa to tha Admiaiatretor of tha Sacoad 
Injury Pund iadieatias tha amooats ao expended. 
XT XS FURTHER OBDBBBO that tha Admiaiatrator of tha Sacoad Injury 
Pund prapara tha aacassary vouchers directing tha Stata Traasurar, as 
Cuatodlaa of tha Sacoad Injary Puad, to reimburse tha Stata Iasuraaca Puad ia 
tha emoeat of 12*384.80, which sum raprasaats tha overpeymcat by tha Stata 
lasuranea Puad of parmaaaat partial Impel rmeat beeeflts aa a rasult of tha 
Industrial injury of December S, 1980. 
IT XS POTTHEt OEDCRtD that tha Stata Iasuraaca Puad shall ba aatitlad 
to reimbursemeat from tha Sacoad Injury Puad for 791 of tha paat temporary 
total coapansatioa aad madical aspaasoa previously paid oa bahalf of tha 
Applieaat aa a rasult of tha ladustrial injury of December $, 1980, said 
reimbursement to ba had upoa tha submission of a Yariflad Patltioo to tha 
Administrator of tha Sacoad lajury Puad indicating tha amounts so axpaadad. 
IT IS rURTHER ORDERED that tha Administrator of tha Second Injury 
Pund prapara tha aacassary vouchors directing tha Stata Traasurar, as 
Custodian of tha Sacond Injury Pund, to pay to Paul Hiddelstadt, compansatioa 
at tha rata of $153.00 par week for 46.8 weeks or a total of $7,160.40, as 
compensation for tha 1S1 parmaaaat partial impairment due to pre-existing 
conditions; the Second Injury Pund shall be entitled to a credit of 
$1,054.59, for the overpeymeat reimbursed to Coatiaeatal Caaualty, aad 
$2,386.80 reimbursed to the Stata Inauraaca Puad for Its overpayment, thereby 
leaving a aet award due aad owing the Applieaat la a lump sum of $3,719.01. 
IT XS FURTHER ORDERED that any motion for tavlew of the foregoing 
ahall be filed la writing within fifteca (13) daya of the date hereof 
specifying In detail tha particular errors aad Objections, aad unless ao 
o? mMmxm^zmm 
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f ilo4, this Ordor shall bo final aad mot aabjoct to rovlov or appoal. 
Passt4 by too lodaatrial Hi—I at loo of/ 
Utah, Salt Lalco CI**, Otabt U U ^ Z & 
**9 *f sfy***^ .1**%. 
